留学生论文网提供美国留学生经济学作业。Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization
Armen A. Alchian; Harold Demsetz
The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec., 1972), pp. 777-795.
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Production, Information Costs, andEconomic Organization
The mark of a capitalistic society is thatresources are owned and allocated by suchnongovernmental organizations as firms,households, and markets. Resource ownersincrease productivity through cooperativespecialization and this leads to the demandfor economic organizations which facilitatecooperation. \$'hen a lumber millemploys a cabinetmaker, cooperation betweenspecialists is achieved within a firm,
and when a cabinetmaker purchases woodfrom a lumberman, the cooperation takesplace across markets (or between firms).
Two important problems face a theory oeconomic organization-to explain theconditions that determine whether thegains from spkcialization and cooperativeproduction can better be obtained withinan organization like the firm, or acrossmarkets, and to explain the structure ofthe organization.
I t is common to see the firm characterizedby the power to settle issues byfiat, by authority, or by disciplinary actionsuperior to that available in the conventionalmarket. This is delusion. The firmdoes not own all its inputs. I t has nopower of fiat, no authority, no disciplinaryaction any different in the slightest degreefrom ordinary market contracting betweenany two people. I can "punish" youonly by withholding future business or byseeking redress in the courts for any failureto honor our exchange agreement. That isexactly all that any employer can do. He(责任编辑：BUG)