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美国留学生经济学作业需求-产品,信息价值与经济组织研究-Production, Information Costs, a(3)

时间:2011-07-07 11:05来源 作者:英国论文网 点击联系客服: 客服:Damien

on those responsible for changes in oz~tpz~t.~'I'he classic relationship in economicsthat runs from marginal productivity to
the distribution of income implicitly assumesthe existence of an organization, beit the market or the firm, that allocatesrewards to resourcesin accord with theirproductivity. The problem of economicorganization, the economical means ofmetering productivity and rewards, is notconfronted directly in the classical analysisof production and distribution. Instead,that analysis tends to assume sufficientlyeconomic-or zero cost-means,as if productivity automatically createdits reward. 'IVe conjecture the direction ofcausation is the reverse-the specific sys-A producer's wealth would be reduced by the presentcapitalized value of the future income lost by loss ofreputation. Reputation, i.e., credibility, is an asset,which is another way of saying that reliable informationabout expected performance is both a costly and avaluable good. For acts of Cod that interfere with contractperformance, both parties have incentives toreach a settlement akin to that which would have beenreached if such events had been covered by specific contingencyclauses. The reason, again, is that a reputationfor "honest" dealings-i.e., for actions similar to thosethat would probably have been reached had the contractprovided this contingency-is wealth.Almost every contract is open-ended in that manycontingencies are uncovered. For example, if a firedelays production of a promised product by A to B,and if B contends that A has not fulfilled the contract,how is the dispute settled and what recompense, if any,does A grant to B? A person uninitiated in such questions
may be surprised by the extent to which contractspermit either party to escape performance or to nullify
the contract. In fact, it is hard to imagine any contract,which, when taken solely in terms of its stipulations,could not be evaded by one of the parties. Yet that isthe ruling, viable type of contract. LL:hy? Undoubtedlythe best discussion that we have seen on this question is
by Stewart Macaulay.There are means not only of detecting or preventingcheating, but also for deciding how to allocate the lossesor gains of unpredictable events or quality of itemsexchanged. Sales contracts contain warranties, guarantees,collateral, return privileges and penalty clauses forspecific nonperformance. These are means of assignment
of risks of losses of cheating. A lower price without warranty-an "as is" purchase-places more of the risk on buyer while the seller buys insurance against lossesof his "cheating." On the other hand, a warranty or
return privilege or service contract places more risk on
the seller with insurance being bought by the buyer.
.ALCHT-AX AND DEMSETZ: ECONOMIC ORGANIZ.4TION 779tem of rewarding which is relied uponstimulates a particular productivity response.(责任编辑:BUG)

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