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美国留学生经济学作业需求-产品,信息价值与经济组织研究-Production, Information Costs, a(7)

时间:2011-07-07 11:05来源 作者:英国论文网 点击联系客服: 客服:Damien

team leader, manager, organizer, owner,or employer. For such decentralized organizationalcontrol to work, outsiders,possibly after observing each team's total
Do not assume that the sole result of the cost ofdetecting shirking is one form of payment (more leisureand less take home money). \Vith several members ofthe team, each has an incentive to cheat against eachother by engaging in more than the average amount ofsuch leisure if the employer can not tell at zero costwhich employee is taking more than average. As a
result the total ~roductivitv of the team is lowered.Shirking detection costs thus change the form of paymentand also result in lower total rewards. Because thecross I,artial derivatives are ,,os,tive, shirking reducesother people's marginal products.output, can speculate about their capabilitiesas team members and, by a marketcompetitive process, revised teams withgreater productive ability will be formedand sustained. Incumbent members will beconstrained by threats of replacement byoutsiders offering services for lower rewardshares or offering greater rewards to the
other members of the team. Any teammember who shirked in the expectationthat the reduced output effect would notbe attributed to him will be displaced if
his activity is detected. Teams of productive
inputs, like business units, would
evolve in apparent spontaneity in the
market-without any central organizing
agent, team manager, or boss.
But completely effective control cannot
be expected from individualized market
competition for two reasons. First, for
this competition to be completely effective,
new challengers for team membership
must know where, and to what extent,
shirking is a serious problem, i.e., know
they can increase net output as compared
with the inputs they replace. To the extent
that this is true it is probably possible for
existing fellow team members to reccgnize
the shirking. But, by definition, the detection
of shirking by observing team output
is costly for team production. Secondly, assume
the presence of detection costs, and
assume that in order to secure a place on
the team a new input owner must accept
a smaller share of rewards (or a promise to
produce more). Then his incentive to shirk
would still be at least as great as the incentives
of the inputs replaced, because he
still bears less than the entire reduction in
team output for which he is responsible.
111. The Classical Firm
One method of reducing shirking is for
someone to specialize as a monitor to check
the input performance of team members.'
' \Vhat is meant by performance? Input energy, initiative,
work attitude, ~ e r s ~ i r a t i orna,t e of euhaustion?
(Contrnut i i )
But who will monitor the monitor? One
constraint on the monitor is the aforesaid(责任编辑:BUG)

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