本文是一篇英国留学生的新媒体作业代写范文,是数字媒体方向的经典Essay Sample,全文3173字,并得到了A-level的分数。想要代写作业的同学可以作为参考。如果有essay代写需求,可以联系我们,如果您想要我们帮助代写论文,也可以提出您的要求,毕业大论文(Thesis)是我们最重要的服务方向。When considering the question, “How useful is the term 'popular feminism' for describing contemporary digital activisms in China?” I realize it cannot be answered directly due to its implicit sub-questions. The first sub-question is: how should we define “popular feminism”? It is impractical to describe something using a term without first understanding its meaning. However, defining such terms precisely in academia is challenging, given the dynamic and ongoing discussions among scholars who often expand or revise the original definitions. For the sake of convenience, I will adopt the definition of “popular feminism” proposed by Professor Sarah Banet-Weiser, whose work is frequently cited in the articles I have reviewed. The second sub-question is: what do contemporary digital activisms in China look like? To address this, I will provide representative examples of digital activisms in China. These examples are considered representative because they are both socially influential and have been the subject of academic investigation.
Based on the sub-questions, this essay will be divided into three parts. The first part will address the questions: (1) What is “popular feminism”? and (2) What key terms are essential when discussing “popular feminism”? In the second part, I will examine the characteristics of digital activisms in China by exploring several representative examples. These examples will then be analyzed in relation to the concept of popular feminism. Areas of compatibility or incompatibility will be highlighted. Finally, in the third part, I will conclude by directly answering the original question: “How useful is the term 'popular feminism' for describing contemporary digital activisms in China?”
Popular Feminism
It is the concept of "popular" that differentiates popular feminism from other strands of feminism. Therefore, understanding the meaning of "popular" is crucial in defining the term. According to Empowered: Popular Feminism and Popular Misogyny, Banet-Weiser defines “popular” in three ways: as media visibility and accessibility, as popularity, and as a struggle for meaning (2018). In the following sections, I will explain these definitions one by one, based on both Banet-Weiser’s and my own interpretations.

The Popular as Visibility
In this definition, feminism is presented as a trend or fashion that is widely pursued, seen everywhere, such as on H&M T-shirts with the slogan “Empower Women” (Banet-Weiser, 2018, p.11), “In Sister We Trust” socks, and handbags featuring images of sisterhood. Beyond daily experiences, visibility can also be measured through digital metrics such as “likes,” clicks, retweets, and more (Banet-Weiser, 2018). Visibility increases through a snowball effect: as it gains more attention, it becomes more visible, encouraging the creation of more relevant content, which then circulates more widely in the market. Banet-Weiser attributes the increasing visibility of feminism to the context of neoliberal capitalism and the rise of digital media (2018). She further explains that digital media offers a space for popular feminists to “create media, voice their opinions, launch a business,” all of which are facilitated by a neoliberal capitalist environment where the market and digital media's circulation capabilities are expanding (2018, p.18).
However, the increasing visibility of feminism is a double-edged sword. While more people in society are paying attention to gender issues such as unequal pay and sexual assault, which makes social change possible, Banet-Weiser warns that visibility, in the form of visual representation, may dangerously become both the beginning and, in some cases, the end of political action (2018). What she implies is that mere visibility is insufficient; it should be seen as a means to achieve social change. Under the neoliberal capitalist framework, the goal of social change is often obscured by the commercializing of feminism and the drive for profit. As Banet-Weiser concludes (2018), rather than challenging the market, popular feminism often facilitates it. While visibility holds power, it does not guarantee changes in hegemonic power relations—especially when visibility itself becomes the goal.
Another aspect of popular feminism I wish to explore is its "happy" nature. As mentioned earlier, popular feminism operates within neoliberal capitalism. The profits generated from increased visibility are made by catering to consumer interests and preferences, which means that popular feminism is not what Sara Ahmed refers to as a “feminist killjoy”—one that provokes hostility through radical proposals. Instead, it is a "happy" feminism (Banet-Weiser, 2018). Its "happy" essence is reflected in the fact that it is widely recognized and accepted by a large group of people who do not feel offended. This acceptance usually stems from the fact that popular feminists’ actions do not provoke real change that might harm certain interests. For instance, the focus on visibility as the goal of political action or the alignment with consumerism, which aims to keep customers satisfied for profit, prevents popular feminism from challenging the status quo. In this sense, I would describe it as a happy, but superficial, feminism.
Based on the above discussion, four key characteristics of popular feminism can be identified: (1) it makes use of digital media; (2) it circulates in an economy of visibility; (3) it is easily accepted by the public, making it a "happy" feminism; and (4) it is likely superficial, given the neoliberal capitalist context it relies on.
The Popular as Popularity
Visibility is not neutral. When Banet-Weiser defines "popular" as popularity, she highlights specific exclusions. As she explains, popularity means “being admired by like-minded individuals” (2018, p.13), which excludes those who do not belong to the group. Banet-Weiser specifically points out that popular feminism privileges “white, middle-class, cis-gendered, and heteronormative” women (2018, p.13), while marginalizing or excluding other feminist voices, such as those of women of color, working-class women, trans women, and non-heteronormative women. This exclusion can be traced to popular feminists’ insistence on a universal definition of identity that is white, middle-class, cis-gendered, and heteronormative, while condemning specificity. For example, popular feminism often promotes a universal definition of equality between men and women, shaped by the experiences of the dominant group. In doing so, popular feminism refuses intersectionality (Banet-Weiser, 2018). In practice, this exclusion is not always apparent, as popular feminists often advocate for diversity. For instance, they call for more women to be represented in different cultural, political, and economic spheres. However, what makes their advocacy hollow is that they do not challenge the existing power structures, or they still focus primarily on the concerns of the dominant group. Banet-Weiser refers to this as a kind of “glossy diversity,” which prevents people from critically examining power relations, as she notes in her conversation with other scholars (Banet-Weiser et al., 2019).
While exclusion exists, popular feminism is closely tied to an accommodating feminism that seeks to be inclusive and non-confrontational toward men (Banet-Weiser, 2018). Consequently, the style of criticism it employs is safe and friendly, inviting men to participate in the conversation about gender inequalities (Banet-Weiser, 2018). Once again, this approach reflects the “happy” essence of popular feminism, which contrasts with Sara Ahmed’s description of an “angry” feminism. In summary, I would highlight two key characteristics of popular feminism: (1) it marginalizes the voices of women who are not white, middle-class, cis-gendered, and heteronormative; and (2) it attempts to include men, making it safe and friendly.
The Popular as Struggle
For Banet-Weiser, popular feminism is a battleground for competing definitions of feminism (2018). It represents the struggle over what feminism is and whose voices are prioritized. Banet-Weiser argues that dominant forms of popular feminism tend to align with the concerns of white, middle-class, cis-gendered, and heteronormative women, while marginalizing more radical, intersectional, or systemic critiques (2018).
In my view, understanding popular feminism as a site of struggle over meaning also allows it to be transnational. Popular feminism can be seen as an "empty box" that holds different interpretations of feminism, with the content inside shaped by local contexts. In every country, there is a version of "popular feminism," but the dominant form of feminism represented within this "box" varies depending on the national or cultural context. Once the dominant feminism is placed in the "box," it takes on characteristics inherent to popular feminism—such as visibility and marketability. This leads me to think that the dominant form of popular feminism, as described by Banet-Weiser, is likely shaped by Western contexts, particularly those of the US and UK, given her focus on these regions. Thus, popular feminism is (1) a site of struggle over meaning, (2) malleable and adaptable to different contexts, and (3) shaped by the need for marketability, as it must be packaged in a way that appeals to the masses.
Digital Feminist Activisms in China
Digital feminism in China can be traced back to the early 2000s, when the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) and several prominent women’s NGOs began creating websites to promote their services and advocate for gender equality. This movement is part of the global wave of digital feminism among the younger generation, characterized by a focus on personal issues and activism that emphasizes hypervisibility, connectivity, and individuality (Hou, 2020). In the following sections, I will explore these commonalities by examining various forms of digital feminist activism that are compatible with the Chinese context.
Utilizing Digital Media to Increase Visibility
As the term “digital feminist activism” suggests, using digital platforms is one of its key features. In addition to building websites in the early 2000s, feminist organizations in China expanded their use of platforms as new forms of media emerged. For example, they created virtual communities via blogs and QQ accounts (Hou, 2020). The most prominent and recent development, however, occurred with the rise of Weibo (similar to Twitter) and WeChat. These platforms allow a growing number of women to engage in public debates about gender issues, such as women’s personal conflicts, in mainstream media (Hou 342).
Furthermore, the widespread use of Douyin (Chinese TikTok) in China has accelerated and deepened the visibility of women’s issues. The video format of Douyin is more attractive and accessible to people with lower literacy levels. As Lin points out, TikTok incorporates entertainment features that attract a wider audience from various social strata, even though it does not necessarily encourage in-depth engagement with public issues (2022). A recent example of this is the TikTok account Bangnvlang·Shanghai (meaning “Helping Girls”), which is associated with a TV program in Shanghai of the same name. In 2023 and 2024, it released three videos about Xiao Xie, a woman who experienced domestic violence 16 times in total. These videos garnered 5.323 billion views on the platform. Later, many private accounts created videos discussing Xiao Xie’s story, domestic violence, and the inadequacy of related laws, helping to raise awareness of these issues among a broader audience. This example demonstrates the potential of TikTok as a powerful platform for digital feminist activism aimed at increasing visibility.
Visibility is not the Only Goal
Digital feminist activism in China aims to create social change, including promoting women's rights, facilitating lawmaking, providing practical support, and raising public awareness about women's issues. Increasing visibility is merely a means to achieve these goals. For example, in the Weibo profile description of the New Media Female Network (NMFN), the organization highlights its commitment to supporting women's human rights. Beyond increasing visibility and publicly declaring their stance on women's rights in digital media, digital feminist activists engage in various practices that can bring about change.
Firstly, instead of abandoning offline activities, they combine them with online practices, creating a mutually reinforcing relationship. For instance, @國際斯拉特 (meaning International Sluts), a group account on Weibo, facilitates offline organizing to combat misogynistic attacks on bisexual and lesbian women (Tan, 2017). Another example is the Gender Watch Women’s Voice (GWWV), which promotes its offline activities that provoke fierce debates about feminist and sexual rights through its online platforms (Han, 2018).
Secondly, Chinese digital feminist activists utilize digital media exposure to generate public opinion, aiming to pressure the government and influence its decision-making (J. Li and X. Li, 2017). A prominent example is the case of sexual harassment at Sun Yat-sen University, which was exposed during the #MituInChina movement. The university initially refused to classify the incident as "sexual harassment," instead labeling the perpetrator's actions as personal misconduct (Hou, 2020). In response, young women organized performative activism at ten universities under the title "Little Redhood Against Sexual Harassment" since 2014. They also ran online campaigns to rally support from netizens and sent advocacy letters containing detailed definitions and regulations about sexual harassment to the Ministry of Education. As a result, sexual harassment has since become a widely accepted framework for understanding such issues in the public sphere (Hou, 2020). This example illustrates how digital feminist activism uses public opinion and visibility on digital platforms to challenge institutional decisions.
Lastly, digital feminist activists in China use visibility to highlight overlooked women's issues and provide tangible support. For instance, Chinese digital feminists initiated the #StandByHer campaign to raise money for hygiene products for female doctors on the frontlines of COVID-19 (Wang and Tavmen, 2024). This movement later expanded into another initiative to provide free sanitary pads in Chinese universities. Although some digital feminist movements in China do not call for legislation or structural changes, they begin with addressing the neglected needs of women and strive to create small but practical changes.
Grassroots Movements but Intersectional?
Unlike long-established women’s NGOs, whose members typically come from women’s federations at various administrative levels, media organizations affiliated with these federations, or research institutions and universities, young feminist groups active in digital media are mostly composed of freelancers and university students. These groups also employ different models of resource mobilization. Specifically, young feminist groups do not seek to directly influence policy-making or legislation within the government like women’s NGOs. Instead, they focus on raising public awareness and exerting pressure on the government for policy change (J. Li and X. Li, 2017). In other words, the activism of women’s NGOs in China operates in a top-down manner, while the digital activism of young feminist groups follows a bottom-up approach to mobilization. This bottom-up mobilization bridges the gap between the activists and the communities they target (J. Li and X. Li, 2017), suggesting that digital activism has the potential to gain popular support within society. The composition of their members, their methods of resource mobilization, and the broader public they reach define the grassroots nature of digital feminist activism in China.
However, when it comes to the intersectionality of digital feminist activism, the situation is more complicated. For example, the #SeeFemaleWorkers movement, which aimed to highlight women’s achievements and workplace discrimination by encouraging women to share their personal stories on Weibo, attracted participants from diverse backgrounds. These included university students, unemployed individuals, employees from various sectors, civil servants, entrepreneurs, factory workers, housewives, and even celebrities (Wang and Tavmen, 2024). This diversity in participants suggests that the movement intersected gender with class. On the other hand, in the #MituInChina movement, which addresses sexual harassment, the personal stories of LGBTQ people and female workers were marginalized or failed to have an impact, as they did not fit into the universalized categories of middle-class, college-educated, heterosexual individuals. This exclusion highlights a lack of intersectional perspectives in terms of class, gender, and sexuality (Hou, 2020).
To conclude, while digital feminist activism in China is rooted in grassroots efforts with a broad base of support, it does not always include intersectional perspectives.
Non-confrontational Movements
Chinese digital feminist activism is often non-confrontational, largely due to strict internet censorship (Yang, 2014). This characteristic can be interpreted in three ways. First, digital feminist activists avoid using extreme hashtags and do not directly criticize Chinese politics or position women above men. Instead, they express their demands in a calm and reasonable manner. This leads to the second point: their ability to garner support and participation from men (Wang and Tavmen, 2024), which is evident in movements such as #MituInChina and #SeeFemaleWorkers. Third, they often cater to market demands, particularly those of market-oriented media (Hou, 2020; Tan, 2017). For example, digital feminist activists create and share attention-grabbing images that combat domestic violence, aiming to attract media coverage and raise public awareness (Hou, 2020).
The key features of popular feminism and digital feminist activism in China share both commonalities and differences. In terms of commonalities, both emphasize the importance of using digital media to increase visibility. However, the types of visibility highlighted in popular feminism include various forms, such as the circulation of commercialized products with feminist slogans in the market. Additionally, the goals of visibility differ. For popular feminists, visibility serves both as a means and an end, which can prevent substantial progress. In contrast, the goal of digital feminist activism in China is not merely to be seen, but to influence policy-making, legislation, or, more tangibly, to raise funds for women in need. If I had to describe it using the term "popular feminism," I would characterize it as a “serious” form of popular feminism.
Conclusion
The second commonality is that both follow the logic of marketability: Popular feminism uses consumerism to attract as many people as possible, while digital feminist activists in China cater to market-oriented media that aims to draw in an audience. In this regard, both share the "happy" essence of popular feminism. Third, both are non-confrontational, striving to include men and avoiding extreme tactics. Lastly, both movements combine grassroots approaches. This is particularly evident in Chinese digital activism. In the Western context, #MeToo emerged as part of a grassroots movement led by African American activist Tarana Burke (Banet-Weiser et al., 2019).
A notable difference in Chinese digital feminist activism is its potential for intersectionality, as seen in the #SeeFemaleWorkers campaign. However, this is not always the case, as the narratives of marginalized groups in China can also be marginalized or excluded.
Returning to the original question: How useful is the term “popular feminism” for describing contemporary digital feminist activism in China? I would argue that the term, as defined by Banet-Weiser, is useful for describing many characteristics of digital feminist activism in China. However, it falls short of capturing the nuances of these characteristics due to the distinct context in China.
References
Banet-Weiser, S. (2018). Empowered: Popular feminism and popular misogyny. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89198/
Banet-Weiser, S., Gill, R., & Rottenberg, C. (2019). Postfeminism, popular feminism and neoliberal feminism? Sarah Banet-Weiser, Rosalind Gill and Catherine Rottenberg in conversation. Feminist Theory, 21(1), 3–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700119842555
Han, X. (2018). Searching for an online space for feminism? The Chinese feminist group Gender Watch Women’s Voice and its changing approaches to online misogyny. Feminist Media Studies, 18(4), 734–749. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2018.1447430
Hou, L. (2020). Rewriting “the personal is political”: young women’s digital activism and new feminist politics in China. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 21(3), 337–355. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2020.1796352
Li, J., & Li, X. (2017). Media as a core political resource: the young feminist movements in China. Chinese Journal of Communication, 10(1), 54–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2016.1274265
Lin, H. (2022). Is TikTok a public sphere for democracy in China? A Political Economy Approach. European Conference on Social Media, 9(1), 88–94. https://doi.org/10.34190/ecsm.9.1.139
Tan, J. (2017). Digital masquerading: Feminist media activism in China. Crime Media Culture an International Journal, 13(2), 171–186. https://doi.org/10.1177/1741659017710063
Yang, G. (2014). Internet Activism & the Party-State in China. Daedalus, 143(2), 110–123. https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00276
相关文章
UKthesis provides an online writing service for all types of academic writing. Check out some of them and don't hesitate to place your order.